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Abstract
There is a specter haunting the American health care system. It is the prospect of widespread chronic
illness and disability in an aging society. With it comes a daunting challenge to our health care delivery
system, social welfare services, families, and communities. And it presents an equally difficult challenge
to millions of us as individuals. For prolonged, slowly debilitating chronic illnesses will most likely be our
companions in the twilight of our lives.
At present, it is unclear whether the American health care and social service systems are prepared to
cope with the challenges, both financial and ethical, that chronic illness poses to our society. Innovative
policy ideas are needed, as are continuing research, extended and better coordinated social senvice
programs, and educational programs that will equip health care providers to meet the special needs of
persons with chronic illnesses.
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Introduction

Ethical Challenges
Chronic Illness
and Arthur L. Caplan

A Hastings Center Report
Special Supplement February/March 1988
This Special Supplement was derived from The
Hastings Center project on Ethics and Chronic
Illness, which was supported by a grant from the
Henry Luce Foundation. The Special Supplement
was edited by Courtney S. Campbell. Contents
copyright 1988 by The Hastings Center. All rights
reserved.

There is a specter haunting the American health care
system. It is the prospect of widespread chronic illness and
disability in an aging society. Mth it coma a daunting
challenge to our health care delivery system, social welfare
s&,
familks, and communitks. And it presents an
equally dzfJicult challenge to millions of us as individuals.
For prolonged, slowly debilitating chronic illnesses will
most likely be our companions in the twilight of our lives.
At present, it is unclear whether the American health
care and social service systems are prepared to cope with
the challenges, both financial and ethical, that chronic
illness poses to our sonety. Innovative policy ideas are
needed, as are continuing research, extended and better
coordinated social senvice programs, and educational
programs that will equip health care providers to meet
the special ma3 of persons with chronic illnesses.
The ethical dimensions of chronic illness and chronic
care have been relatively neglected topics in the overall
Jield of bioethics. Chronic care is a tedious, grinding labor
of Stsyphus. It lacks the visibility and f d n a t i o n of the
high tech dramas played out in acute care settings. But
the practical ethical dilemmas raised by chronic care are
no h s important than those in acute care, and the special
c h a r b t i c s of chronic illness make it an ideal domain
in which to explore some neu ethical and philosophical
appoaches. Chronic illness is not only a social issue that
must be addressed, it is also a poignant and perplexing
facet of the human condition where fiesh insight can be
sought. Meeting the needs of those with chronic illness,
and treating them with just& and dignity as full-jledged
members of the moral community, will tax our common
energies, the public purse, and our moral imagination.
In 1984 The Hastings Center began a three-year project
on Ethics and Chronic Illness with supportfim the Hen9
Luce Foundation. The project was premised on the
hypothesis that the spenal nature of chronic care and the
distinctive experience of chronic illness may lead to a
transformation in many peruasive assumptions about the
ethics andgoals of medicine. The individualisticperspective
behind much of the moral discourse of &ethics and social
policy does not fare well in application to chronic illness
and chronic care. Conc@ts such as patients' rights,
autonomy, and best interests need to be revised in this
context. In its confrontation with chronic i l l m , medicine's
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own understanding of its goals and mission must also
be redejned. Intensive, high technology treatmat oriented
toward cure and fill restoration of function, which has
provided the dominant orientation for much of medicine
in recent years, is usually inapp-opnate to the needs and
problems of the chronically ill. A medical care system that
lacks a sense of purpose beyond these goals will j n d itself
increasingly uncmtain and inept in theface of the demands
placed upon it by chronic care.
T h report offered here grows out of the overall work
of t h Ethics and Chronic Illness Project. Chronic illness
is an exceedingly broad subject, and it has been more
dzfJicult than we imagined to capture a glimpse of the
rich n m agendafor bioethics that chronic illness provides.
We hope nonetheless to have outlined some of that agenda
in a way that will stimulate others to r&ne and pursue
it firther.
We are most gratefil for the expert advia, pidunce,
and support we received from the members of the project
research group, and others who took part in several
meetings held during the past three years. Most of the
project group members have m a r e d their own papers
and studies on various topxs touched upon in thefollowing
pages. These studies comprise an already substantial body
of original work in t h ethics of chronk illness, and we
have drawn heavily upon them. An edited book containing
these papers is currently being prepared for publication.
It will save as a companion volume to this Special
Supplement, and will be useful to those who wish to pursue
in more depth some of the points we have raised.
We would like to thank the Henry Luce Foundation
for providing thejfinancial support that made our project
and this Special Supplement possibk
Bruce Jennings
Daniel Callahan
Arthur L. Caplan
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b e v e r e chronic illness is a domineering,
- unremitting presence in the lives of millions of
Americans. Its onset, at whatever age, forces a
revision of many hopes and expectations. When it
first appears, chronic illness may seem like an
unwelcome intruder, but eventually it becomes a part
of oneself, still unwelcome, with which one must
learn to live as best one can. In the years ahead
chronic illness will enter the lives of more and more
people-children and young adults who survive
conditions once fatal in the first few months or years
of life, and those over sixty-five who survive or avoid
the acute illnesses of middle age. This will present
an inescapable, possibly overwhelming problem for
the American health care system. How we respond
to chronic illness will be a litmus test for the character
of American society.
Comprehending chronic illness requires an
appreciation of the multifaceted ways in which it
affects the individual, the web of familial and social
relationships surrounding each chronically ill
person, and the overall system of health care and
social welfare services. Underlying organic dysfunction-chronic diseuse-is only one aspect of the total
reality of chronic illness. The disease afflicts brains
and bodies, the illness affects persons, and with them
families and communities. Moreover, medical care
is only one, and not always the most important,
aspect of the social support and provision persons
with chronic illness need in order to cope with the
manifestations of their disease, manage the tasks
of daily living, and maintain their independence
and sense of self-worth.
However, recognizing the multifaceted psychological, social, and ethical, as well as medical reality
of chronic illness is only the first step. We still lack
an adequate understanding of the meaning and
ethical implications of chronic illness in the lives
of individuals, families, and the broader society; and
we lack as well a serviceable vocabulary of concepts
and categories with which to address its meaning
and implications. Above all, we lack a guiding vision
of how a just and good society should accommodate
the special needs of its chronically ill members, care
for them, and support them in their quest to live
meaningful, satisfying lives with-and in spite oftheir chronic illness. At a time when a comprehensive public discussion of how to meet the present
and future challenges posed by chronic illness is
sorely needed, this lack of a guiding moral vision
is a serious problem.
The purpose of this report is to stimulate a broader
discussion of the distinctive ethical issues posed by
chronic illness, and to outline an agenda for future
bioethical investigation in this area. Concomitantly,
our aim is to articulate at least the rudiments of

a guiding moral vision that comes from both learning
about chronic illness and learningfiom i t A guiding
moral vision is needed to focus the efforts of
individual caregivers, families, support groups,
advocacy organizations, and local communities. It
is needed to make the growing presence of chronic
illness in our midst an occasion for strengthening
the ties of mutual respect, benevolence, and caring
between young and old, sick and well, in families
and communities. Finally, on the national stage, a
new moral perspective can help to inform a broad
public consensus about the appropriate goals of
chronic care and to give direction to public policies.

A Challenge for Bioethics
Preventing or curing chronic illness is certainly
better than living with it, both for the individual
and for society as a whole. It is tempting to assimilate
chronic illness to the currently prevailing outlook
of acute care medicine, seeing it as yet one more
frontier for science and technology to conquer and
to cure. As desirable as primary prevention and cure
may be in the abstract, however, an exclusive
emphasis on such objectives overlooks the full
dimensions of the problem. Over time it may indeed
be possible to limit the incidence of some chronic
diseases and to ameliorate their effects. With an
aging population though, it is virtually certain that
the prevalence of chronic illness will increase
dramatically between now and the middle of the
next century, as the postwar baby boom becomes
the "elderly boom" beginning in 2010.
Medicine's historic response to infectious disease
and acute, self-limiting diseases of short duration
does not offer an adequate way of understanding
or responding to the personal, social, and ethical
challenges posed by chronic illness and disability.
What is needed, instead, is a different conception
of the proper ends of medicine in the face of chronic
illness, and beyond that, a better understanding of
the human and social meaning of chronic illness.
The task of bioethics includes clarification of such
issues. However, much of the moral discourse of
contemporary bioethics is oriented by problems in
acute care, and thus may overlook the distinctive
issues raised by chronic illness and chronic care.
There are two principal reasons for this. First,
bioethics has been centered upon-and has helped
to construct-an individualistic moral perspective in
which the promotion of individual autonomy and
the protection of individual interests are the
paramount ethical goals. Second, while this
emphasis on autonomy has overthrown some of the
paternalistic attitudes traditionally associated with
the so-called medical model, it has not fundamen-
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tally altered the medical model's basic understanding
of the nature of illness and the goals of care. This
individualistic perspective and this continued
attachment to the underlying assumptions of the
medical model comprise what we shall refer to as
the "autonomy paradigm" in bioethics.
Our thesis is that the autonomy paradigm is
inadequate for chronic care, and that the develop
ment of a new bioethics of chronic illness is needed.
It should begin with a recognition of the challenges
chronic illness poses to many widespread value
assumptions and institutionalized practices within
and outside the health care system.Three challenges
in particular merit special attention:
Chronic illness poses a challenge to our
understanding of the ends of medicine, the nature
of the physician-patient relationship, and the ethical
principles and standards governing health care
decisionmaking.
Chronic illness challenges the normal moral
boundaries of caring,and conventional expectations
about the caregiving duties of the family in relation
to the social welfare obligations of the state.
Chronic illness challenges our understanding
of socialjustice and community, as these ideals are
reflected in society's response to different kinds of
health care and social service needs.

Definitions
Chronic illness may be defined as a condition
that lasts for a substantial period of time or has
sequelae that are debilitating for a long period of
time. It is also commonly defined as a condition
that interferes with daily functioning for more than
three months in a year, causes hospitalization for
thirty days or more per year, or (attime of diagnosis)
is likely to do either of these.
Defined generally in these ways, chronic illness
includes a very broad spectrum of diseases that differ
significantly from one another in their underlying
causes, modes of treatment, symptoms, and effects
on a person's life and activity. Some prevalent
chronic conditions are life-threatening,such as heart
disease, cancer, and stroke; others, such as arthritis,
gout, epilepsy, and chronic sinusitis, are not. Some,
like insulin dependent diabetes, cystic fibrosis, and
muscular dystrophy are marked by early onset;
others are primarily diseases of old age, like
Alzheimer's disease, arteriosclerosis, emphysema,
and osteoporosis. Conditions such as spina bifida,
multiple sclerosis, Parkinson's disease, and Alzheimer's disease, have a devastating effect on one's
life, while conditions such as hypertension, asthma,
and ulcers can be controlled without undue
disruption in normal activities. Overall, chronic

diseasesvary greatly in their developmentalcoursesome conditions improve over time, some stabilize,
and others are progressively degenerating and
debilitating. Moreover, within specific disease
categories individuals vary tremendously in the
severity of their impairment and in their ability to
manage their illness.
In this report, we shall explore the ethical and
social meaning of severe chronic illness amid the
kaleidoscopic diversity of chronic illnesses. We
intend to identify the common human needs and
experiences that emerge in the encounter with
severe chronic illness, and to examine generic
ethical problems present in a range of different
conditions. This task requires a more specific and
unified focus than the broader definitions mentioned above permit. Accordingly, we will concentrate primarily on organically based, severe chronic
conditions that lead to signijcant loss of function or
disability and generally have a slowly but p-ogressively
debilitating course.
The group of illnesses distinguished by this
emphasis on duration, severity, and progressive
debilitation is still quite large, but share many
common characteristics. They involve the greatest
personal hardships and the heaviest financial costs
for medical care. Aside from chronic mental illness,
which would require a separate study and another
report to address adequately,these are the conditions
most in need of fresh ethical analysis and new policy
strategies. Though these illnesses can be medically
managed and their development slowed (a process
sometimes referred to as "secondary prevention"),
they cannot be "cured in the sense of being
physiologically arrested or fully compensated for.
Typically, the long-term course of such conditions
can be foreseen, but the pace and daily manifestation
of symptoms in individual patients is highly variable
and uncertain. Finally, many if not all of the severe
chronic conditions we will be concerned with are
accompanied by intermittent acute episodes and
other treatable problems. Thus most of the care and
management of severe chronic conditions takes
place outside the hospital setting, but persons with
these conditions will have an abnormally high
number of hospital days, physician visits, and
restricted activity days per year; and they will require
some assistance with the activities of daily living and
eventually a substantial amount of nursing and
custodial care, either in an institutional setting or
in the community.

Elderly Boom, Chronic Care Avalanche
At least since the 1930s, chronic illness has been
perceived as the principal health care challenge of
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our time. The challenge has not diminished in the
last fifty years. Chronic care for all who need it in
an aging society will place enormous demands on
an already exceedingly costly health care system.
Now and in the future it may be said that virtually
everyone will suffer from a chronic illness at some
time during their lives. But in the vast majority of
cases the illness will not be severe enough to alter
drastically the person's normal activities or to require
excessive utilization of health care services.
A useful focus on the problems created by severe
chronic illness can be gained through data on
morbidity and limitation of daily activities contained
in the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS)
begun in 1957. In the late 1960s questions
concerning the prevalence of specific chronic
diseases were added to the survey. NHIS and similar
data show trends indicating a general pattern of
decreasing mortality and rising morbidity for middleaged and older people since 1957, with particularly
marked changes occurring in the 1970s.
In 1984 approximately 24 percent of those
reporting chronic illness also reported moderate or
major limitations in their activities. The current
prevalence of severe chronic illness in the
population as a whole is difficult to gauge. Moderate
estimates place the figure at approximately thirty
million people. Moreover, both the incidence and
the prevalence of all types of chronic illness are
positively correlated with increasing age, and rise
to particularly high levels in the population over
sixty-five. Of those aged sixty-five to sixty-nine in
1984,31.8 percent had a limitation in a major activity
and 16.9 percent were unable to carry on a major
activity. For the elderly population the leading
chronic health problems are arthritis (36 percent
of men; 50 percent of women), hearing impairments
(33 percent and 25 percent), hypertension (32
percent and 43 percent), heart disease (26 percent
and 28 percent), and chronic sinusitis (14 percent
and 17 percent).
While the increase in the prevalence of chronic
illness during the past twenty years has been
troublesome enough, the truly staggering problems
still lie ahead. The demographics of an aging
population virtually ensure a chronic care avalanche.
The institutional and financial implications of this
for the health care system are enormous. In addition,
the prospects for competition among age groups for
limited public benefits and scarce economic
resources are sobering.
In 1900 4.1 percent of the U.S. population (3.1
million people) were over sixty-five. By 1984 that
number had grown to 28 million people or 11.9
percent of the population, and proportionally the
largest areas of increase were among the "old old"

(seventy-five to eighty-four) and the "very old"
(eighty-five and above). Moreover, people over
seventy-five will become an increasingly significant
factor in our society as their numbers increase both
in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total
population. The baby boom cohort is now an
upwardly moving bulge in the pyramid-shaped graph
of age distribution in the United States. The aging
of the baby boomers, together with slowly rising birth
rates and more rapidly declining mortality rates at
all ages, will transform this triangle into a rectangle
by the middle of the next century.
The effect of these demographic changes upon
the health care system will depend largely upon the
age of onset of severe chronic diseases and
disabilities affecting the elderly. Some analysts
believe that future lifestyle changes and more
effective medical prevention and treatment will make
the average age of onset increase more quickly than
life expectancy, thereby producing a "compression
of morbidity" in which the duration of chronic
illnesses before death will be less than it is now.
This relatively optimistic scenario rests on shaky
epidemiological grounds, as well as expectations of
widespread changes in health related behavior,
something which is notoriously difficult to predict
or control. At any rate, the hope of making chronic
illness less chronic is a very risky assumption upon
which to base future health policy planning. For
the moment, it seems wiser to be guided by less
optimistic scenarios, and to anticipate nearly
threefold increases in the number of physician visits,
hospital admissions, and nursing home placements
that the elderly will require between now and 2040.

Policy Challenges
The past record of policy regarding chronic care
does not suggest that our political and policy
processes are well equipped to meet the challenges
that lie ahead. During the last two decades some
progress has been made in providing needed
financial assistance and services for the chronically
ill. But individual patients, families, and private
charitable organizations still bear a heavy share of
the financial and in-kind costs of chronic care, while
publicly funded health care entitlement programs
and social welfare safety nets remain fragmented
and uneven in their coverage. In 1984 the
Congressional Budget Office estimated that Medicare enrollees paid on average more than $1,000
annually in out-of-pocket medical expenses (for
deductibles, cost-sharing, and noninstitutional care,
such as prescription drugs,not covered by Medicare).
When nursing home care is accounted for, the
average annual out-of-pocketexpense rises to $1,705.
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Moreover, the burdens of chronic illness still fall
most heavily on the low income elderly, the medically
indigent and uninsured, the working poor, women,
and minority groups. Data gathered in 1977 reveal
that poor and near poor elderly persons with severe
chronic conditions (those living at home with annual
health care bills over $2,500) had to devote a large
share of their household income to out-of-pocket
expenses. Those eligible for both Medicare and
Medicaid had to spend 10 percent of their income;
for those relying on Medicare alone the figure rose
to a staggering 53 percent In the 1980s and beyond,
the future needs of the chronically ill are on a direct
collision course with the goal of health care cost
containment and a general dismantling of welfare
state services.
In fact there is not now, and never has been,
a public policy strategy designed to address chronic
illness as such. By and large, chronic illness has
been responded to in an indirect fashion, as it is
associated with other categorical factors such as age,
poverty, or work related disability. The traditional
lack of a comprehensive chronic illness policy is
perhaps related to the fact that political advocacy
groups have organized around specific diseases.
Each chronic disease has its own subcommunity of
medical and scientific experts, its own network of
treatment centers, advocacy groups, celebrity
spokespersons and fundraisers, and its special
champions in Congress. Unfortunately, instead of
finding common cause in the generic needs of the
chronically ill, these groups are more often busy
competing against one another for scarce research,
health care, and social welfare dollars.
This state of affairs is understandable enough.
It reflects the long-standing pattern of interest group
pluralism and the ideology of government-as-thelast-resort that characterize the American political
system. It also indicates that chronic illnesses are
highly diverse in their physiological causes,
treatments, prognoses, and effects. Their victims
often have little in common politically, economically,
or culturally aside from age and the experience of
disease itself. This results in a "disease of the month"
health policy sweepstakes; its winners are those
conditions afflicting very large numbers of citizens
(cancer), genetic diseases affecting a well defined
or powerfill ethnic constituency (sickle cell anemia
and cystic fibrosis), and conditions that are medically
"interesting" and lend themselves to something akin
to cure in terms of the acute care medical model
(chronic heart, liver, and kidney disease).
This is one reason why we believe it is important
to focus more attention on the common, generic
problems and effects of chronic illness, and on the
shared needs of the chronically ill population as

a whole. As a prelude to a new politics of chronic
health policy, this focus on the generic aspects of
the chronic illness experience can provide a more
sharply defined, coherent sense of the ethical issues
that are distinctive to chronic illness, but do not
simply arise in the treatment of a specific disease
or disability. Medically, persons with arthritis,
diabetes, multiple sclerosis, cystic fibrosis, and
Alzheimer's disease may have little or nothing in
common. But ethically, socially, and in the end
politically too, their common interests and needs
may be much more significant than their differences.
The Experience of Chronic Illness
For the individual perhaps the most salient
general feature of chronic illness is the transformation it causes in the texture of personal and social
life. The person with chronic illness is thrust into
unfamiliar and often inhospitable worlds-frequent
hospital stays and encounters with highly complex,
impersonal, and often frightening modes of acute
medical treatment; prolonged and inconvenient
regimens of medication, special exercise, and
restricted diet; a continuing round of bureaucratic
hassles with a disjointed system of medical and social
service professionals and agencies;the daily prospect
of sometimes disabling pain; the perpetual uncertainty that comes from the intermittent flair-ups of
debilitating symptoms and the occasional onslaught
of an acute, life-threatening episode.
Chronic illness also threatens the integrity of more
familiar aspects of a person's life. It punctuates one's
life with frequent periods of restricted activity,
immobility, and unwanted dependency on others.
It often interferes with the ability to work, which
threatens the person's basic livelihood and
economic security, to say nothing of more ambitious
career plans. Chronic illness and disability are often
stigmatizing; intolerance, fear, and misunderstanding, at one extreme, and well meaning but
humiliating and patronizing sympathy at the other
often greet the chronically ill in their everyday social
lives. Lost friendships, withdrawal and isolation, and
an emotionally draining struggle to sustain dignity
and self-respect are often the consequence.
Cutting even more deeply into the person's life,
chronic illness also transforms intimate and family
relationships, placing new burdens on both the
person who needs special care and family caregivers
whose own lives and hopes must often be drastically
revised to accommodate such needs.

Chronic Illness and t h Self
Finally, it is important to understand the ways in
which chronic illness can shape or transform the
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person's self-identity. The impact of chronic illness
on a person's self-image and sense of meaning and
purpose in life can be either beneficial o r
detrimental, and in many cases it is both. The ordeal
of chronic illness can be experienced as an enabling
experience, o n e that sharpens the person's
appreciation of remaining powers and abilities,
quickens sensibilities and talents that had been
dormant, and brings out a depth and strength of
character previously untapped and unrealized.
Alternatively, along with social stigma and isolation,
chronic illness can leave the individual bereft of
purpose and deeply alienated from the condition
of his or her own body and the truncated future
possibilities of life.
Above all, the relationship between chronic illness
and self-identity is a dynamic one. It is affected by
many variables, including current symptoms of the
disease, the reactions of family, friends, and
caregivers, and the various strategies individuals use
to sustain themselves. As sociologist Kathy Charmaz
observes: "Realizing a preferred identity and
possessing a valued self is a constant struggle for
those with serious illnesses.. ..Illness forces people
to experiment, adapt, and reorganize in order to
maintain control over themselves and their lives.
In this sense chronically ill people are innovators."
Chronic illness raises exceedingly complex
philosophical questions about the nature of the self
and the continuity-or discontinuity-of self-identity
over time amid changes in organic capacity, social
circumstances, and in the ability to actively shape
and direct one's life. Is the self an entity that stands
above and apart from the body and the social
persona so that even drastic changes in body or
persona leave the essential identity of the self
unchanged? Or, at the other extreme, is the self
so constituted by the organic condition of the body
and external social perceptions, that in the face of
progressively debilitating and disabling chronic
disease it may be said to have no essential stability
at all?
While an adequate position on the relation
between a concept of self and the impact of chronic
illness is difficult to formulate, reflection on such
issues is important because of their relevance for
ethical and policy questions. Philosophical assumptions about the nature of the self stand behind most
of the central ethical principles we use to direct the
ends and procedures of health care, and also inform
the goals we set in fashioning social policy and in
designing the structure of the health and social
service delivery system. Without understanding how
the self is affected by the experience of living withand in spite of-chronic illness, we will not be able
to say with any specificity how the basic principles

of respect for persons, patient autonomy, and the
duty to promote wellbeing should apply to chronic
care, nor how to specify the needs, rights, and
interests of persons with chronic illness. We will lack
a framework for adequately addressing how the
chronically ill should be served by policies of health
care financing, the design of institutional arrangements for medical and social services delivery, and
the allocation of scarce resources.
In contemporary society, chronic illness is a dark
thread woven through the fabric of our lives; virtually
everyone who lives a normal life span will undergo
some type of chronic illness, and virtually everyone
will be related to, love, work with, and care for
someone who is chronically ill. Chronic illness thus
has a significance that is at once uniquely personal
and universally human. It creates special needs and
vulnerabilities that set individuals and families apart,
and it also creates a common bond among us in
the reminder it provides of the inescapable fragility
of the human condition. It generates conflict, but
also the possibility of concord.
Chronic illness calls for a particularly careful and
sensitive kind of moral reflection. We must somehow
acknowledge the distinctive needs and interests of
the chronically ill, without thereby treating them like
a special class or cutting them off from common
membership in our moral community. We must
provide needed health care services without turning
the chronically ill into a dependent, institutionalized
clientele of the health care professions. We must
support families and voluntary communities that
provide assistance with the activities of daily living
and supplement these efforts with publicly funded
programs. But we must do so without eroding the
special sense of familial obligation that is still
powerful in our society despite changing lifestyles
and family patterns, and without transforming
personal care into an impersonal commodity that
is merely bought and sold. Our social policies must
be guided by ideals of justice and compassion and
a due sense of the public entitlements that the
chronically ill should possess as a matter of right,
while at the same time setting reasonable limits
on the claims persons with chronic illness can
make.
A full discussion of these objectives, and the
policies for attaining them, is well beyond our
capacity in this essay. As a starting point for further
research and discussion, though, we believe it is
useful to begin with currently prevailing ethical
frameworks in three domains-the professional
ethics of medicine, the ethics of family relationships,
and notions of socialjustice that inform public policy.
We will explore the implications of chronic illness
in each of these contexts.
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Toward a Bioethics of Chronic Illness

Chronic medical care has a number of distinctive
characteristics. Most chronic care does not involve
complex diagnostic procedures or invasive interventions and monitoring under direct supervision of
a physician in a hospital setting, but rather longterm drug and rehabilitative therapies that must
largely be camed out by patients themselves, with
only periodic monitoring and adjustments by
professionals. The compliance and involvement of
patients are crucial to the efficacy of most forms
of chronic care. When these factors are affected
by the patient's home environment and family
support, as is typically the case, the family also
becomes integral to the care.
For the physician this raises delicate ethical
questions concerning issues of privacy, confidentiality, and patient autonomy. How much should family
members be told about the diagnosis and prognosis
of a chronic illness, and when? If family members
must have direct involvement in the implementation
of a treatment regimen, do they have a right to be
involved in deciding among alternative possible
treatment plans? Where should the line be drawn
between justifiable paternalism and unacceptable
manipulation and coercion when physicians and
family members attempt to modiQ the behavior of
a noncompliant patient?

T h Autonomy Paradigm
During the past two decades a systematic
conceptual framework for understanding the ethical
dimensions of medical decisionmaking has been
gradually constructed and relied upon by those
involved in the study of bioethics. Although a
considerable gap still exists between bioethical
theory and actual medical practice, the importance
of the bioethics movement should not be underestimated. Drawing on expertise within the health
care professions, as well as work in philosophy,
theology, law, and the social sciences,bioethics offers
an influential view of what medicine is and should
be-what human values it can and should serve,
what legal and public policy frameworks should
govern it, and what institutional forms it should take.
Three interrelated notions form the conceptual
infrastructure of most contemporary bioethics and
constitute what we shall call the "autonomy
paradigm." The first component of the autonomy
paradigm is a particular interpretation of the
meaning of illness and the goal of medicine: illness
is seen as an alien threat to the self, and the goal
is to defend and restore the self by curing or
compensating for the illness. This notion is often
referred to as "the medical model" of illness.

The second component of the autonomy paradigm is a particular understanding of the role of
the patient and the nature of the physician-patient
relationship. According to this view, which is often
called the "contractual model" of medical care, the
patient is a rational, self-interested subject who,
threatened by illness, voluntarily enters into a
contractual agreement with a physician (or other
health care provider) and temporarily submits
himself or herself to medical authority in order to
combat the illness.
A decidedly individualistic conception of the
person is the third component of the autonomy
paradigm. In this view, self-identity, autonomy, and
interests are conceptually prior to and independent
of the encounter with illness and the experience
of participation in the caregiving process. This
individualistic conception of the person is the
linchpin that connects the medical model, the
contractual model, and the commitment in mainstream bioethics to promoting the autonomy and
best interests (wellbeing) of the patient
Although it is not often conceptualized in precisely
this form, we believe that the autonomy paradigm
underlies most public discussions of health care, and
is an intellectual force to be reckoned with. It has
become "institutionalized" in health care delivery
through the influence of court rulings, government
regulations, and organizational policies in hospitals
and other health care facilities. Equally important,
it has become the predominant framework for
reflection about how we should respond morally
to future health care needs and how future public
policies that will enable the health care system to
meet those needs should be devised.
Does this paradigm provide a serviceable
framework for understanding the ethical dimensions
of chronic illness? We argue that it does not As
one's attention shifts from acute care and medicine's
attack on curable disease to chronic care and
medicine's contribution to the quality of life lived
with chronic illness, the medical model and the
contractual model require substantial revision.
Above all, chronic illness provides a context in which
the shortcomings and limitations of an individualistic
conception of the person become particularly
apparent

Disease as t h Enemy
It is generally recognized that serious acute illness
poses a threat to the individual, and morally requires
others to assist the individual in counteracting that
threat In instances of life-threatening emergencies,
and in most cases of acute care medicine even when
the condition is not immediately life-threatening, the
person's needs, the proper actions for the physician
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to take in response to those needs, and the scope
of the moral rights and responsibilities of the parties
involved are all reasonably clear. By and large with
acute illness-pneumococcal pneumonia is a good
example-the source of the threat can be singled
out and identified-the invading organism, the
disease process, the biochemical malfunction. In
acute care establishing the correct diagnosis is more
than half the battle, for it is on that basis that the
remaining course of treatment usually proceeds.
Having identified the threat, it is also easy to
identify what is threatened-life, health, a level of
"normal" functioning that can be restored to the
statm quo ante. Moreover, the threat is viewed as
evil because life, health, and function are intrinsic
values or primary human goods; they are the
foundation for the pursuit of all our other ends.
Finally, physicians know how to respond to the
threat-the range of appropriate medical treatments
is determined by the current state of medical
knowledge, and perhaps there will be one specific
intervention, a "magic bullet," that will eliminate the
threat once and for all.
The central theme of the medical model is thus
the idea of illness as a threat that suddenly intrudes
upon a preexisting condition of health and wellbeing.
This perspective supports the military metaphors
commonplace in our cultural ideology of medicine.
Disease is the enemy within. The patient and physician
enter an "alliance" in which the technical "armamentarium" of medicine is used to defend the patient and
to attack the invader. Restoration of the status of the
person prior to the illness-cure-is
the objective
sought in the campaign.
Seeing the illness as a threatening intruder serves
to externalize and objectify it, and makes the illness
a thing, extrinsic and foreign to the person even
though it is inside the body. Illness represents a
temporary unfreedom imposed upon the person by
an alien source, a heteronomy that thwarts selfdetermination and the pursuit of life's "normal"
goals. Similarly, illness undermines wellbeing
because wellbeing is taken to be, as the term implies,
a state of being well without-not in spite of-illness;
a state of being for which illness is an Other.

The Patient Role and the Medical Contract
Individuals confronted with acute illness generally
define their needs and interests in the same way
that the medical model defines them, thereby
collaborating with their physicians in a common
endeavor to cure the disease and to restore health
and function. Acutely ill persons submit themselves
to medical authority as "patients," a role that is often
taken to imply passivity, but in fact might better be
described as one of active cooperation and

compliance. In the context of acute care, the patient
role is warranted. Even though it places one under
external authority, it can be justified on grounds
of prudence: it furthers the person's own goals, it
is a temporary, self-limiting status and the person
regards the acute illness as an extrinsic threat to
his or her being rather than as a constitutive feature
of it.
In recent years an emphasis on truthtelling,
informed consent, and a generally more active role
by patients (or their designated surrogates) in the
process of medical decisionmaking-all in the name
of individual self-determination or autonomy-has
tended to set aside benevolent paternalism and
professional expertise as the basis for physician
authority. In their place, bioethics has substituted
the notion of rational, voluntary consent to medical
care and medical authority. This development of
a normative framework for medicine is remarkably
akin to the classical liberal contractarian account
of political authority and obligation. Bioethics has,
in essence, imported liberal individualism into the
health care arena. Under the autonomy paradigm,
therefore, the provider-patient relationship is viewed
as contractual in nature. It is the social contract of
the liberal polity writ small-a structure of reciprocal
rights and obligations voluntarily entered into by
both parties in order to achieve goals together that
neither party acting alone could achieve.
This framework, while holding potentially
significant practical implications, has probably been
more influential in challenging a certain paternalistic and authoritarian style of medical practice than
in challenging the basic medical model and patient
role notions. Medical authority based upon rational
("competent") patient consent is still medical
authority. A patient-centered ethic of autonomy may
be empowering and rights-enhancing for the
individual, but it remains a perspective focused on
the role of patient, and makes certain unanalyzed
assumptions about the relationship between that role
and the other roles in a person's life. Adding respect
for patient autonomy to the promotion of patient
wellbeing (beneficence) as a principled obligation
of health care providers still leaves the cure of disease
and the restoration of function as the central ends
of medicine, in so far as these goals provide the
rationale for the decision of autonomous agents to
enter into the role of patient in the first place.
Moreover, the moral injunctions of the Hippocratic
tradition-use medical knowledge and skills only
for the benefit of the patient (beneficence) and do
no harm (nonmaleficence)-can readily be accommodated to the newer moral emphasis on individual
autonomy so long as "benefit" and "harm" are
interpreted broadly enough to encompass the
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patient's own values, beliefs, and conceptions of the
good, as well as his or her bodily needs.
In short, the autonomy paradigm has both
solidified a strongly individualistic, patient-centered
orientation in medicine, and preserved the basic
assumptions about the ends of medicine that inform
the medical model and the contractual model in
the context of acute care. The acute care "bias" of
mainstream bioethics is thus not simply a function
of the fact that most work in bioethics has
concentrated on cases and problems arising in
institution-based acute care settings. That bias, which
has served bioethics well and has been quite
appropriate in many discussions, is deeply
embedded in the conceptual structure of the
autonomy paradigm.

at least not ideal health, which is a chimera in any
case-but rather the wholeness and the integrity
of the self. Persons with chronic illness really have
no choice but to try to integrate their illness
constructively into their daily lives and sense of selfidentity. The desideratum is to stay intact-to make
the necessary adjustments with as little loss of
purpose, coherence, and meaning in life as possible.
Indeed, they may be able to replace former plans
and aspirations with even more fulfilling new ones.
Living with chronic illness is thus a process of
negotiation.As sociologistAnselm Strauss points out,
such a process involves many kinds of hard workthe work of controlling a sometimes irascible body,
the work of managing one's biography or selfidentity, the work of orchestrating the presentation
of self in everyday life.
Whereas acute care aims to restore one's freedom
from illness, the goal of chronic care is to sustain
meaning in life lived with-and in spite of-illness.
Diplomacy is perhaps a better metaphor than
warfare for this kind of care. Medicine's role in
chronic care is to facilitate the process of negotiation.
Many people experience a period of anger and
denial when their chronic illness is first diagnosed
or its symptoms first appear. It is tembly difficult
and unsettling to recognize chronic illness as
something to negotiate with rather than as an
invader to be defeated. But over time most people
find that separating themselves from their illness
is not a viable or satisfying response to their
condition; they must work through the phase of
denial to a more constructive kind of reconciliation,
without moving to the opposite extreme of defeatism
and undue dependency.
Part of the task of medical care and counseling
is to assist persons with chronic illness as they ride
this emotional roller coaster. At one stage of
psychological adjustment to their illness it is not
uncommon for persons with chronic illness to
become extremely passive and dependent upon their
health care providers, or other caregivers. On the
other hand, the long duration of chronic illness and
many years of experience with a particular form
of medical therapy make chronically ill persons
much more knowledgeable about their condition
than acute care patients tend to be, or even some
of the physicians they see.
Chronic illness tends to foster a wide variety of
styles and stages of being a patient. No single model
of the patient role can capture the diversity and
dynamism of chronic care adequately. It elicits an
equally diverse set of relationships with physicians.
In this setting, the rationalistic quid pro quo of the
contractual model seems thin and unrealistic.

How Is Chronic Care Different?
Earlier we noted a number of factors that make
chronic care different from acute care-the reduced
emphasis on diagnostic investigation, comparatively
less understanding of the etiology and biologic
pathways of the disease process, the variability and
uncertainty of clinical symptoms, the lack of constant
medical supervision and the reliance on the patient
and family members to cany out long-term drug
and rehabilitative therapies, and the manifest lack
of magic bullets to cure the illness. These factors
suggest some obvious ways in which the acute care
medical model fails to describe-or to guidechronic care.
With chronic conditions, by and large, illness
cannot be conceptualized as an alien presence
within the person, or as an aberrant situation that
marks a temporary, reversible departure from the
person's "normal" state. Chronic care must proceed
from the recognition that chronic illness is a
component of the person's overall state of being.
Depending upon the specific chronic disease,
medical therapy offers a variety of different effects,
ranging from remission or slowing the progress of
the disease to artificially compensating for impairments and managing symptoms. These therapies
share an objective to help people accommodate
themselves to the chronic illness, which cannot be
vanquished or eliminated. The overall goal of
chronic care is to mitigate the limitations that chronic
illness inevitably brings with it in a person's life,
and to control the damage that the illness might
otherwise do. More specific, clinically defined goals
such as rehabilitation, pain relief, and the control
of symptoms through drug therapy, diet, and
exercise, are consonant with this end.
In the face of chronic illness the paramount good
that medicine should serve is not precisely health-
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Embodied Autonomy
These considerations suggest new ways of
thinking about the role of being a patient, the nature
of the physician-patient relationship, and the ethical
values, especially individual autonomy, that should
inform that relationship.
The traditional paternalistic model of care cast
theperson aspatient into a largely passive and obedient
role. More recently the autonomy paradigm has
emphasized respect for the patient as a person, a more
equal and active partner in the process of medical
decisionmaking and health care. But the person or
self in the autonomy paradigm is taken to be an
entity separate from and independent of the illness,
with preestablished interests that are also independent of the illness. As a practical matter, individuals
with chronic illness are rarely, if ever, "patients" in
either of these senses.
The contractual model of the physician-patient
relationship is based, as we have seen, on the idea
that the principal goal of patients is to protect their
interests-to protect them from the illness that
threatens them and to protect them from the
illegitimate or paternalistic exercise of medical
authority.According to this account, a person's interests
are fixed, stable over time and set prior to the person's
encounter with illness. However, even if this notion
of interests may fit the situation of acute care (we
would question whether it does), it is exceedingly
problematic in the realm of chronic illness.
Interests may be defined subjectively as conditions
of existence that the person finds valuable and wants
to obtain. Alternatively, interests may be defined
objectively as those conditions of existence that do
in fact enhance the person's good and wellbeing.
Chronic illness transforms interests in either sense;
subjectively by altering the person's sense of self,
and his or her possibilities and limitations, and
objectively by altering the conditions necessary for
wellbeing and human flourishing. The primary
obligation of chronic care medicine, then, is not
to protect the person's interests in the sense of
keeping them from being affected by illness-that
is impossible-but rather to assist the person in
keeping the transformative power of illness under
control, to integrate new subjective interests (wants)
and new objective interests (needs) into a coherent
and satisfying life.
The issue of compliance with a prescribed course
of treatment, for example, a drug or dietary regimen,
illustrates this. Compliance with a treatment program
to which informed consent has been given is clearly
one of the patient's duties according to the
contractual model. In the abstract, rationalistic world
where this model is most at home, compliance is

obviously in the patient's best interest, to the extent
that persistent noncompliance is taken as prima facie
evidence of the patient's lack of decisionmaking
capacity, and a symptom of denial or maladjustment.
This interpretation may be correct in many cases,
but as a generalized account it has serious blind
spots and overlooks a much more complex drama
often played out in chronic care. Persons with
chronic illness must manage their illness socially
and psychologically as well as medically; they must
strive to prevent the illness from overwhelming their
sense of efficacy and the control they, like all of
us, wish to exercise over their lives and activities.
Interactions with health care providers are one scene
in this drama of self-assertion and control.
Noncompliance-or
better, patient-determined
compliance-with medical orders is one negotiating
strategy that persons with chronic illness use to
achieve their social and psychological objectives,
even at the expense of optimal attainment of their
medical goals.
If, as we have argued, chronic care is more about
negotiating with illness than about combatting
disease, then the duties of the physician must also
be rethought in this broader context. Respect for
patient autonomy does not dictate a straightfornard
course of action when the physician is faced with
a noncompliant patient in chronic care. Physicians
should be more sensitive to the meaning and
purpose of such behavior, but it does not follow
from this that they simply have a duty to acquiesce
in this particular style and patient strategy.
Acquiescence is not necessarily respectful of
autonomy, and attempts to modify the patient's
behavior do not necessarily reflect a presumptuous,
disrespectful kind of paternalism. Managing the
illness in a self-affirming way is-or should bethe common goal of the physician and the
chronically ill person. The question for caregivers,
then, is whether they can help the patient design
some other, less medically harmful, coping strategy
that will achieve the same psychic ends as well as
or better than noncompliance.
The dynamic and transformational aspects of
chronic illness necessitate modifying conventional
bioethical interpretations of autonomy and the
physician's duty to respect or enhance autonomy.
The importance we have ascribed in chronic care
to sustaining an intact, well-integrated self who is
in control of, not controlled by, the illness, derives
in a certain sense from the value of autonomy. Thus
it is not the notion of autonomy per se that we
find inadequate. The problem lies rather in the
peculiarly individualistic interpretation often given
to the concept of autonomy, in which autonomy
means freedom from external limits or constraints.
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In this perspective, the autonomous self is a
disembodied self; it is independent of and prior to
its social milieu and its bodily condition.
This individualistic interpretation of autonomy is
a philosophical fiction-an ideal of selfhoodrather than a notion rooted in our lived experience.
Still, it might be argued that this interpretation is
useful as a heuristic conception that points us in
the right direction morally.
However, when this conception of autonomy is
applied to chronic care as a guiding ethical principle,
its shortcomings, even as a heuristic notion, become
apparent Individualistic autonomy builds protective
fences between the self and others; chronic care
must restore the fabric of community and a web
of mutual support and interdependency, beginning
with the cooperative-not contractual-ties between
patients and providers. Individualistic autonomy sets
up a logical opposition between freedom and
constraint, and between respecting a person and
helping that person grow beyond the limits of his
or her present self-understanding.
In chronic care freedom and constraint, respect
and guidance intertwine and become symbiotic.
Protecting the patient's rights and interests is no
less important in chronic care than it is in acute
care, but it is essential to build trust and to avoid
a climate of adversarialism. Chronic care is on its
most solid ethical footing-and is therapeutically
most effective-when both those receiving and those
giving care recognize their common purpose, and
when they both have the flexibility to move toward
a deeper understanding of how best to preserve the
integrity of the person in the face of chronic illness.
Physicians and patients must both learn from and
teach each other in the process of chronic care.
There is time enough for this, and on an out-patient
basis it should be possible to maintain the necessary
continuity.
Autonomy is not some a priori property of persons
abstractly conceived. It is an achievement of selves
who are socially embedded and physically embodied.
This is perhaps the single greatest lesson to be
learned from chronic illness. Autonomy is something that grows out of the physician-patient
relationship, not something that presides over it. And
not out of this relationship only, but out of all aspects
of life lived with-and in spite of-chronic illness
and all facets of chronic care.

The Limits of Family Obligations
Ties of kinship, marriage, and sustained intimacy
create special psychological and moral bonds in our
lives. Families, a term virtually impossible to define
precisely in American society at present, are

composed of these ties and bonds, and so constitute
a distinctive social space, a space where rules and
expectations apply that are somewhat different from
those in impersonal, public places and in transactions among strangers.
Family life, and especially the moral obligations that
family members have toward one another, is
challenged by severe chronic illness in two ways: first
by the burdens imposed on families by chronic care;
and second by virtue of the fact that severe chronic
illness in a family can pose a crisis for our traditional
moral expectations concerning family life.
Families now provide a principal source of social
support and daily assistance for persons with severe
debilitating chronic illness. Many of these people
are homebound much of the time, and reside in
the same household with one or more family
members. Even those who live alone often have
family members nearby who visit regularly to assist
with cleaning, shopping, cooking, and other tasks
that the chronically ill person is not able to perform
unaided. In some instances the costs of such care,
including financial expenses as well as time and
emotional stress, can become overwhelming to the
caregiver, and place a threatening strain on the
family itself.
Clearly, the chronically ill person, no matter how
diacult or demanding, is not to blame for a situation
like this. The burdens an illness imposes on the ill
person and the family caregivers alike are artifacts
of the social and cultural context in which they live.
In the United States the burdens of chronic care on
families are increased by the lack of public services
and community facilities. These facilities could
substitute for some aspects of family care and could
promote a greater opportunity for independent living
by the chronically ill. However, this lack of social
support does not completely account for the dilemmas
and burdens families experience in chronic care.
Dilemmas also arise from the moral expectationsfamily
caregivers quite properly impose upon themselves, and
the cultural ideal of what it means to be a good person
in a family role-a good spouse, a good parent, a
good son or daughter.
Chronic illness forces us to consider how strongly
we want to continue to adhere to these expectations
and ideals, despite the very real costs and hardships
they sometimes create when put into practice. Would
our social morality be worse off if we lessened or
abandoned them? Should we, in the name of
individual autonomy both for the chronically ill and
for family members, move toward replacing familybased care with such innovations as group homes,
programs to encourage independent living, professionalized home care services, and greater access
to long-term care institutions for those needing only
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unskilled nursing and "custodial" care? Should we
as a society come to see chronic care as exclusively
a public responsibility, and remove this function
from the private lives of families altogether?
The tempting and obvious response to these
questions is, can't we have it both ways?As a practical
matter, families will continue to play a key, but not
exclusive role in the provision of chronic care. The
political struggle for expanded benefits and better
public financing for long-term care (both home and
institutional)will continue, and voluntary community
based services will continue to plug some gaps in
public assistance and provide some respite and
alternatives for weary family caregivers. But it is and
will be an uneasy solution, with plenty of guilt and
caprice to go around.
It remains to be seen whether our society will
be able to move toward a system that responds to
the complex needs of both families and individuals.
Earlier we noted the historical absence of any
coordinated public policy on chronic illness, and
nowhere is the lack of such a policy more apparent
than in the ambivalent attitudes displayed concerning the role of families in chronic care.
In the health care system, for example, confusing
signals and conflicting trends abound. On the one
hand, there is a trend toward deinstitutionalizing
chronically ill patients who require sophisticated and
even intensive forms of medical and nursing care.
Severely disabled babies who were rescued from lifethreatening complications by neonatal intensive care
immediately after birth fall into this category, as do
children who are chronically ventilator dependent
or who require total parenteral nutrition. A new
generation of medical technology has made these
developments possible. They are also promoted by
cost-containment considerations and by prevailing
medical opinion that such children receive better
care and are more likely to do well at home.
A similar trend that places the responsibilities of
care in the hands of family members is a spillover
from institutional interaction between the hospital
and the nursing home industries. Prospective
payment systems give hospitals an incentive to
discharge patients more quickly, and as a result
nursing home beds are now occupied by more
gravely and acutely ill residents than ever before.
Nursing homes, in turn, are beginning to have their
own financial incentives to give priority to skilled
nursing rather than "custodial care," in a quest to
obtain the highest levels of state Medicaid reimbursement. Unless new kinds of step-down residential
care facilities are created, families in the future may
not be able to turn to institutional care as a safetyvalve option when the pressures of chronic care
mount.

At the same time, countervailing trends signal a
decreasing reliance on family members in the
provision of chronic care. In recent years more
generous federal and state reimbursement for the
cost of paid home care has stimulated the growth
of the home health care industry, which has a sizable
for-profit sector. This represents a major step toward
the commercialization of services that family
members-especially women-have traditionally
performed on an altruistic basis.
In addition, the private insurance industry is
beginning to develop individual and group policies
covering the costs of paid home care and long term
institutionalcare. In the wake of the recent extension
of Medicare coverage for long hospital stays, some
support is also growing for a federally financed long
term care entitlement program. Many questions
about the adequacy and scope of these initiatives
remain to be answered, but it does appear that
insurance coverage for chronic illness and long term
care is an idea whose time has finally come in the
United States. Assuming that this coverage is truly
comprehensive and widely available, it will make
persons with chronic illness less dependent on their
families.
Finally, in the largely individualistic ethos of our
society the self-denying and self-sacrificingcaregiver
does not receive much validation or moral support.
Self-denial is viewed as a destructive characteristica pathological trap that family caregivers for the
chronically ill often fall into-rather than as a
praiseworthy virtue.
These trends and attitudes reveal a considerable
uncertainty about the proper role of the family in
chronic care. Traditional values persist and family
members often have no choice other than to assume
these responsibilities; but at the same time families
are increasingly demanding new options, which the
government and the marketplace are slowly
beginning to provide.
We believe there is a clear and compelling need
to provide more professional and community
support to families caring for chronically ill
members. These supports include publicly financed
home care services with appropriate quality
assurance and licensure mechanisms, respite care
programs, so-called adult day care programs,
counseling services, educational programs and
support groups, and the like. No family can be
expected to shoulder the entire responsibility of
chronic care alone, and the considerable inequities
that now exist in access to supporting care services
should be eliminated as these services are developed
and extended in the future.
The question, as we see it, is not whether public
and community services should be provided to
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supplement family care, but what goals these family
assistance programs should serve and what moral
aspects of family relationships we want to preserve
and strengthen as we publicly assist families with
their caregiving responsibilities. For the danger is
that assistance with responsibilities may subtly be
transformed into denial of responsibilities.
This danger can be avoided by creatively
integrating family caregivers into coordinated
networks of health care and social services, so that
they won't feel either that they have abandoned
chronically ill relatives, or that they must face the
seemingly unending task of care alone. Such
coordination represents a mixed public and private
system that would both protect families from being
overwhelmed and preserve the high moral expectations we have traditionally affirmed about the
special obligations family membership confers. Such
a system might better serve the needs of persons
with chronic illness as well, because it is not clear
that paid professional care can be a full substitute
for family care that grows out of love and a special
sense of moral commitment.
Justice and Community

The growing prevalence of chronic illness will
necessarily lead to an extension of long term care
and social service programs. Both acute and chronic
illness in an aging society will lay claim to a
substantial portion of our national resources,
probably more than the eleven percent of GNP now
devoted to health care expenditures. It is equally
clear, however, that this expansion cannot be
unlimited. Health care and social services will always
have to be balanced with other pressing social needs
like education, environmental protection, capital
investment to improve industrial competitiveness,
national defense, housing, and transportation. This,
in turn, will create the need to set priorities within
the health care sector, as is done now, but perhaps
more explicitly on the basis of clear principles of
justice and equity.
Setting limits and priorities in health care takes
two forms. First, priorities are established among
persons or classes of persons by granting them
differential access to health care. Second, priorities
are set by the allocation of resources-funds for
research and capital expenditures, manpower, third
party reimbursements-among various kinds of
health care services. The first influences who will
receive care; the second affects the kind of care
those who gain access to the system are most likely
to find available.
Throughout this essay we have emphasized the
differences between acute and chronic care. When

the issue of access to health care is raised, however,
we believe there is no principled basis for differentiating between those who are acutely ill and those
with chronic conditions.Various accounts may be given
of whatjustice requires as a basis for distributingaccess
to health care. Some theories claim that the provision
of just and equitable access is a human right Others
maintain that it is a societal obligation growing out
of the needs and special vulnerability of those who
are sick Still others hold that equitable access is
required by a sense of communal solidarity and mutual
respect. None of these theoretical accounts of justice
provides any reason to believe that the rights, needs,
or dignity of the chronically ill have less moral weight
than those of the acutely ill. Of course, justice does
not require that individuals should receive any and
all health care they might conceivably want Equitable
access does not mean unlimited access, either for acute
or chronic care. But when policies are made that have
the effect of rationing health care, they should not
discriminate against persons with chronic illness.
If principles of justice call for equity of access
without regard to the chronicity of the health care
need, however, they do not directly answer the
question of what equitable access should be access
to. Here the problems posed by acute care and
chronic care do begin to diverge. In the first place,
the scope as well as the duration of chronic care
is broader than acute care. It involves not only
medical treatment and professional medical and
nursing services, but also a wide range of social,
educational, counseling, and rehabilitative services.
Proper coordination among these various components of chronic care-as well as attention to related
issues such as housing, transportation, and employment opportunities-is as important as access to
these services per se. Even when adequate services
are in place and are open to chronically ill persons
who would benefit from them, these services are
often scattered, hard to identify, and inconvenient
to use.
Moreover, the pattern of internal priorities within
the health care system as a whole affects the type
of care and services made available to chronic
patients. In the United States today those priorities
are decidedly skewed in favor of acute care
interventions and technologically complex modes
of diagnosis and treatment. The massive investments
we have made and are making in these areas of
medicine have certainly created a system well
designed to respond to the acute episodes and lifethreatening crises that punctuate the course of some
chronic illnesses, and one with a powerful capacity
to extend the length of life.
However, our system does not give adequate
attention to the distinctive goals of chronic care that
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we have identified in this essay. Existing policies
of health care financing, and priorities in medical
education and research give short shrift to the quality
of life goals of chronic care-negotiating with and
through an illness, and sustaining integrity and
intactness in the face of unavoidably disruptive
symptoms and limitations. In order to meet the
ethical challenges chronic illness poses to our health
care system, it is not sufficient simply to seek
prevention and cures for chronic diseases, nor to
extend the duration of life lived with chronic illness
via impressive acute interventions-as vital as these
objectives are. Chronic care medicine must also
create within itself a holistic, supportive environment
where persons with chronic illness can construct
their own lives in a meaningful way. Beyond this,
chronic care medicine must be part of a broader
effort to create that type of environment in society
as a whole.
Achieving equitable access to health care, setting
reasonable limits to an otherwise insatiable and
quixotic quest for perfect health, and reorienting
our priorities in accordance with a revised understanding of the ends of medicine-these are among
the principal challenges of social justice in an aging
society marked by widespread chronic illness. And
they touch not justice only, but also our vision of
public purpose and our sense of community.
Chronic illness is a reminder of the universal
frailty and uncertainty of the human condition. The
presence of chronic illness in our midst is a moral
challenge not simply because it threatens the
interests or, as one philosopher has put it, the
"normal opportunity range" of those who are
chronically ill at any given time, but rather because
it forces us to confront the question of how a good
society should accommodate the expectable-but
always unexpected-misfortunes
that occur in
everyone's life. The provision of care and social
support for persons with chronic illness by
temporarily well and able-bodied citizens reflects an
acknowledgement of the links thatjoin the sick and
the well, the young and the old in a community
of common humanness and vulnerability.
As we move toward new public policies in response
to chronic illness, rights-based conceptions of social
justice and individualistic conceptions of interests
and autonomy should be tempered by a communitarian perspective such as this.
Past experience with other health and social
welfare policies in the United States indicates how
difficult it will be to achieve this moral perspective.
All too often when claims of special need have been
publicly recognized and addressed, the ensuing
programs have served to stigmatize the recipients
of public assistance, to increase their dependency

on professional service providers and bureaucratic
institutions, or to identify them in the public mind
as "special interests" that overburden government
finances.
Perpetually at risk of having benefits reduced or
of paternalistic interference by professionals who
determine eligibility or control access to services,
recipients (or advocacy groups representing them)
have responded by reasserting their rights. This is
an understandable and perhaps unavoidable
response in American political culture. But it
nonetheless has the unhappy effect of pitting those
with special needs against the broader society. It
also perpetuates a situation in which different groups
seeking special assistance must each make their
claims seem more compelling than others in order
to compete for limited public resources.
It would be naive to expect that the development
of new and expanded programs of chronic care will
not be accompanied by the usual civic discourse
of individual rights and the normal pluralistic politics
of interest group competition. However, a thoughtful
appreciation of the meaning of chronic illness as
a human experience may at least serve to supplement, if not replace, this individualistic perspective
of competing, mutually exclusive rights and interests.
Setting priorities and making trade-offs among
conflicting claims are vital aspects of public policy,
to be sure. Analyzing problems in this way is not
objectionable in and of itself. The danger arises
when this is all we think about and talk about, for
then civic discourse tends to lose sight of equally
important communal goals of public policy-the
cultivation of solidarity, reciprocity, and mutual aid;
the identification of public goods; the nurturing of
common endeavor. Chronic illness doggedly insists
that we attend to these goals.
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